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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Owners or Operators: Two
Distinct Paths to Parent Corporation Liability Under
CERCLA-United States v. Bestfoods
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of public fear and outrage resulting from widely reported environ-
mental disasters at places such as Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums,1
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).2 Two fundamental goals of Congress are evident
throughout the statute. The first is to provide for the cleanup of hazardous
substances that have been, or threaten to be, released into the environment.3 The
second is to hold responsible parties liable for the cost of the cleanup.' As one court
has commented, "Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by
the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the
harmful conditions. 5
To achieve this end, Congress cast a wide net to expropriate those parties who
might be responsible for the release of a hazardous substance. However, in its
alacrity to address the great threat to public health and welfare posed by hazardous
waste disposal, Congress did not specifically state whether parent corporations of
responsible parties should be brought within the purview of CERCLA.6 Prompted
by this statutory silence, much debate and litigation has arisen over the requirements
necessary to hold a parent corporation liable for the acts of its subsidiary under
CERCLA's "owner or operator" provision.7 Adding to this debate has been
increased public sensitivity to environmental issues, large remediation costs, and
an inability by responsible parties to pay, resulting in increased pressures on
environmental agencies and courts to extend liability to so-called "deep pockets".'
Parent corporations are often the targets of liability based on their ability to pay, no
1. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18-19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,6121-23. The
Report describes Valley of The Drums, "[a]t the Valley of the Drms [in Kentucky], thousands of barrels were
stacked illegally in the hauler's backyard... in a seriously deteriorating state... [S]ome have already burst and
spilled their contents on the ground." Id.
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compesation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. U1 1996)).
CERCLA is often referred to as "Superfund" after the hazardous substance response cost fund that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses to fund the cleanup of dangerous sites. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994
& Supp. II 1996) (creating the "Hazardous Substance Superfund"); 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (a) (raising revenue for
Superfund by taxing the petroleum and chemical industries).
3. See H.R. REI. No. 99-253, pt. 3. at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038 (discussing
CERCLA's purpose during reauthorization amendment).
4. See id.
5. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982).
6. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L
REV. 986, 987 (1986); see also Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame and Piercing the Veil in the Mists of
Metaphor: Supreme Court's New Standards For the CERCLA Liability of Parent Companies and A Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 67 FORDHAM L REV. 115, 126 (1998) (footnote omitted).
7. See infra Part H.D.
8. See Mark F. Rosenberg, Parent, Successor, and Alter Ego Liability Concerns in the Transactional
Setting, 25 SuMMER BRIEF (A.B.A.) 29 (1996).
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matter how remote the connection to the contaminated site.9 Against the backdrop
of the above concerns and guided by the "bedrock" rule of limited corporate
liability, courts and commentators have reached a wide variety of conclusions on
this significant issue.'0
It was in this environment that the Supreme Court addressed the application of
CERCLA's "owner or operator" provision to parent corporations. In United States
v. Bestfoods1 the Court considered whether, under CERCLA, a parent corporation
that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a
subsidiary may, without more, be held liable as an operator of a polluting facility
owned or operated by the subsidiary. 2 The Court found that liability may not attach
in these circumstances unless the corporate veil can be pierced. 3 The Court further
held that a corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over,
the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an
operator of the facility.' 4
Part II of this note discusses CERCLA liability in general, as well as the three
theories used by the courts to hold parent corporations liable for the environmental
wrongs of their subsidiaries. Part II also includes a brief discussion of the principles
of limited corporate liability, which is an important background to the CERCLA
"owner or operator" liability issue. Part I examines the district court's decision
that -forged a new, middle ground of CERCLA liability, 5 and the subsequent
reversal of that decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which adopted a
narrow, veil-piercing standard. 6 Part IV examines the Supreme Court's reasons for
finding the district court's holding too broad and the appellate court's too narrow,
and concludes that the Supreme Court significantly clarified CERCLA's "owner or
operator" provision. Part V analyzes Bestfoods and determines that the decision
maintains respect for traditional notions of corporate liability while at the same time
furthering the goals of CERCLA. This section also contains an analysis of three
related issues that will undoubtedly be the subject of litigation following the
decision, specifically: (1) the Court's failure to announce a veil-piercing standard;
(2) the lack of guidance the decision offers to corporations and government
enforcers in determining an acceptable level of parent corporation involvement; and
9. See id at 29 (reasoning that CERCLA looks to the past for liable parties and often subsidiaries are no
longer in business or lack assets thus making parent corporations primary targets); see also Ronald G. Aronovsky
& Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F.
L. REv. 421,422-23 (1990) (explaining that parent corporations are often targeted for liability because the assets
of responsible corporations are often inadequate to pay for the cleanup and that many such corporations have
sought bankruptcy); Susan D. Sawtelle, U.S. v. Bestfoods: Supreme Court To Issue First Ruling on Corporate
Superfund Liability, METRo. CoRP. CouNs. 60, col. 1. n.6 (discussing a case recently filed by the government
seeking cleanup costs and punitive damages from a corporation that never owned, operated, or even leased the
contaminated site). The CERCLA liability claim is based on "insubstantial" favors that the unrelated corporate
defendant performed. See id.
10. See infra Part H.D.
11. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). As noted by the Court, CPC Int'l, Inc. has recently changed its name to Bestfoods.
See id at 56 n.3. Accordingly, CPC is used throughout the Court's opinion and this casenote.
12. See id. at55.
13. See id.
14. See id
15. See CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 573 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
16. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 30
UNITED STATES V. BESTFOODS
(3) the effect the decision may have on the relationship between parent corporations
and their subsidiaries. Finally, Part VI appeals to legislative action as the only
means to further clarify owner or operator liability under CERCLA.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Hazardous Waste Problem
The reality of the hazardous waste problem is seeping into the everyday lives' of
Americans. As of August 1998, officials of the EPA and other federal agencies
reported there were more than 1200 sites on the National Priorities List"7 requiring
cleanup under Superfund.'8 Astonishingly, more than 3000 sites await determination
of status for the purpose of a National Priorities listing. 9 Of these potentially
eligible sites, ninety-six percent are located within a half mile of places of regular
employment or residences, the majority presenting a possibility of direct contact
with contaminants." Roughly seventy-three percent of the eligible sites have
contaminated groundwater, and another twenty-two percent could contaminate
groundwater in the future.2" EPA has estimated that cleanup will cost over $500
billion.2 Yet, the problem is not abating. In 1980, the year CERCLA was enacted,
the EPA estimated that the United States produced 57,000,000 metric tons of waste
a year, a figure equal to about 600 pounds per citizen.23 Moreover, the EPA
predicted that this amount would grow at an annual rate of three and one-half
percent.' Congress sought to tackle this expensive, pressing and growing problem
by seeking to ensure that parties responsible for hazardous waste contamination
bear the costs of its cleanup. 5 Hence, Congress passed CERCLA.
17. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENvIRONMENTAL POucY LAw 798 (3d ed.
1996). The authors explain that EPA maintains a database known as CERCIJS (the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Information System) listing all known polluted sites and cleanup activities.
This database contains over 40,000 sites. In order to be listed on CERCLIS, a preliminary assessment is done and
the site is scored according to the severity of the contamination on the Hazardous Ranking System (HRS). If the
site scores over a certain level, it can be placed on the National Priorities List (NPL). An NPL listing enables EPA
to take remedial action at the site. See id.
18. See UNrrED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFRCE, HAZARDOUS WASTE-UNADDRESSED RISKS AT
MANY POTENTIAL SUPERFUND SrTEs 2 (Nov. 1998) [hereinafter GAO].
19. See id. at 4.
20. See id. at 5.
21. See ieL at 4.
22. See Susan R. Poulter, Cleanup and Restoration: Who Should Pay?, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 77, 84 (1998) (footnote omitted); Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis Under
CERCLA: Finding Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH. U. LQ. 223, 229 n.23 (1994) (citing to
various authorities for financial estimates).
23. See Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L REv. 579, 585 (1993).
24. See id.
25. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; GAO, supra note 18 at 27 (stating that government officials
are uncertain whether potentially eligible sites will be cleaned up and to what extent responsible parties will
participate).
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B. CERCLA 's Contribution to Solving the Hazardous Waste Problem
Unlike its statutory predecessors and contemporaries,26 CERCLA is remedial
rather than regulatory.27 CERCLA looks backward to redress environmental
problems caused by hazardous waste produced and abandoned in the past, rather
than looking to prevent future problems.2" CERCLA was designed to complete a
broad statutory program of environmental protection.29 Accordingly, CERCLA has
been described as the missing link3° in a "cradle-to-grave regulatory scheme"'" for
hazardous wastes.
As the missing link statute, courts interpret CERCLA liberally to effectuate its
goals.32 Imposition of liability under CERCLA requires: (1) the contaminated
property or site is a "facility";3 3 (2) a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from the facility has occurred; 3' (3) response costs have been incurred as
a result of the release or threatened release;35 and (4) the party to be held liable falls
within one of the four classes of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) identified
in Section 107 of CERCLA.36 Each of the requirements is interpreted broadly under
the Act in order to effectuate CERCLA's goals.37
26. See for example, The Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387(1994 & Supp. 11 1996); The Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1994 & Supp. H 1996); and The
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,6126 (discussing
deficiencies of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp.
II 1996) and the intent to establish a mechanism to address problems associated with abandoned and inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites). But see Silecchia, supra note 6 at n.7 (noting that CERCLA also performs
regulatory functions).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985) (stating that CERCLA
is "by its very nature backward looking. Many of the human acts that have caused the pollution already had taken
place.").
29. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016 at 22 (stating that "[a] major new source of environmental concern has
surfaced: the tragic consequences of improperly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices
known as the 'inactive hazardous waste site problem."').
30. See Erika Clarke Birg, Comment, Redefining "Owner or Operator" Under CERCLA to Preserve
Traditional Notions of Corporate Law, 43 EMORY L. J. 771,772 (1994) (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at772.
32. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that CERCLA is liberally construed to effectuate its goals); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp.,
872 F.2d 1371, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that CERCLA's liability scheme allows liberal judicial interpreta-
tion); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) ("CERCLA should
be given a broad and liberal construction. The statute should not be narrowly interpreted.. . to limit the liability
of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond the limits expressly provided.").
33. 42 U.S.C § 9601(9) (1994 & Supp. 1H 1996) defines facility as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a
sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,
storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to
be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Oswald, supra note 22, at 230-31; see also Amy C. Stovall, Note, Limiting Operator Liability for
Parent Corporations Under CERCLA: United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 43 ViL. L REv. 219, 229-30 &
n.31 (1998) (isting judicial decisions broadly interpreting CERCLA in order to effectuate its goals).
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The courts' broad interpretation of CERCLA is evidenced by judicially inferred
standards of liability despite the statute's silence on these issues.3" CERCLA's
standard of liability has been construed as strict liability.39 Similarly, liability is
joint and several for indivisible harm although no express statement exists in the
statute.40 Finally, liability is retroactive."1 Courts have often justified this widened
net of CERCLA liability by raising CERCLA' s broad remedial goal.42
The defenses available also evince the sweeping liability imposed by CERCLA.43
An otherwise liable party will not be held responsible when the release of hazardous
substances was caused by an act of God, an act of war, or a third party with no
relationship to the defendant if the defendant can show that adequate precautions
and reasonable care were exercised to avoid the release." Predictably, courts have
interpreted these defenses narrowly.45
CERCLA's net of liability was cast in Section 107(a) towards four classes of
parties potentially responsible' for environmental remediation costs:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility, (2) any person who at the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract,
38. See id at 224 ("Liability under CERCLA is Draconian and deliberately so."); see also Silecchia, supra
note 6, at 128 (declaring that liability under CERCLA has been interpreted as "joint, several, strict, and
retroactive") (footnotes omitted); infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended
that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability was not included
in the compromise.").
40. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[w]here the environmental
harm is indivisible liability is joint and several."); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir.
1988) (recognizing that CERCLA does not mandate joint and several liability, but does permit it).
41. See United States v. Northeastern Phann. &Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,732-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating
that while CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactive liability, retroactive liability was the intent of
Congress).
42. See cases cited supra note 32.
43. See, e.g., Stovall, supra note 37, at n.37-38 (discussing generally CERCLA's defenses). Additionally,
Congress added an "innocent purchaser" defense in the 1986 amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1994
& Supp. II 1996).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (b)(1)-(4) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
45. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("With CERCLA's basic
remedial purposes in mind, the Court narrowly construes the defenses provided under section 107(b).").
46. Responsible parties must bear the following costs:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State
or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and (D) the
costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this
title.
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include interest on the
amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D). Such interest shall accrue from the
later of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the
expenditure concerned. The rate of interest on the outstanding unpaid balance of the amounts
recoverable under this section shall be the same rate as is specified for interest on investments
of the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of title 26.
For purposes of applying such amendments to interest under this subsection, the term
"comparable maturity" shall be determined with reference to the date on which interest accruing
under this subsection commences.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
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agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances...,
and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport ....
Within the four categories, CERCLA further defines "person" to include an
"individual, fimn, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture,
commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." The term "owner or
operator", however, is defined circularly to include any person owning or operating
a facility.49 In short, there is nothing in the statutory language addressing parent
corporation liability for the acts of its subsidiaries." Neither is the legislative
history helpful, as the Act has "virtually no legislative history at all."'" Complicat-
ing the problem is Congress' unwillingness to clarify the issue.52 Thus, it is with
little congressional guidance that courts have determined the nature and extent of
parent corporation liability under CERCLA.
C. A Brief Discussion of the Principles of Limited Corporate Liability
It is against the backdrop of CERCLA, labeled the "most radical environmental
statute in American history," 3 that traditional principles of limited liability for
parent corporations have been applied. 4
Traditionally, corporate shareholders are only investors in the corporation in
which they own stock. 5 Shareholders are not typically liable for the acts and
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(l)-(4).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A): The term "owner or operator" is defined as:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel,(ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, tide or control of which was conveyed due to
bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or
local government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such
facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
50. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 126 n.59 (listing commentators who have concluded that CERCLA is
silent as to the liability of parent corporations).
51. Mark E. McKane, Comment, Operator Liability for Parent Corporations Under CERCLA: A Return
to Basics, 91 Nw. U. L REV. 1642, 1652 (1997) (citing Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVrL L 1,1
(1982)).
52. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 174-175 & n.310-11 (discussing Congressional optimism on Superfund
reform, but inability to accomplish such reform because of conflicts over issue of the liability).
53. Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L REV. 1458, 1465 (1986) (footnote
omitted).
54. The principles of corporate limited liability are beyond the scope of this casenote. Therefore, the issue
is only addressed to briefly illustrate the competing interest these principles create if CERCLA is interpreted to hold
a parent corporation liable. For a detailed discussion of these principles, see PHn.LP L BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 4.02 (1987 & Supp. 1997).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc. 768 F.2d 686,690 (5th Cir. 1985). Discussing the issue
of limited liability, the court found:
Under the doctrine of limited liability, the owner of a corporation is not liable for the
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obligations of the corporation beyond the extent of investment in the entity.56
Corporate shareholders are generally viewed as entities separate from the
corporation in which they own stock." Consequently, shareholders are normally
protected from a corporation's liabilities by the corporate veil.58 This type of limited
liability exists for both individual and corporate shareholders, including parent
corporations."
However, there exists an important exception to the protection of limited liability
afforded a parent corporation known as corporate veil-piercing. Piercing the
corporate veil refers to the process of disregarding the corporate entity in order to
hold corporate shareholders, directors, or parent corporations liable for the acts of
the corporation or subsidiary.6' As the Court in United States v. Milwaukee
Refrigerator Transit Co.62 stated:
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until
sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.'
Veil-piercing is a deeply embedded doctrine that goes by several names." No matter
"65the name, veil-piercing is consistently criticized as a "rather vague notion".
In deciding whether to pierce the veil, courts look to the degree of control a
parent corporation has exercised over the subsidiary and the extent to which a
parent has respected corporate formalities.' Factors relevant to veil-piercing
corporation's debts. Creditors of the corporation have recourse only against the corporation
itself, not against its parent company or shareholders. It is on this assumption that "large
undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted."
Id. (citations omitted).
56. See, e.g., I WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 33, at 522 (pen. ed. rev. vol. 1999) (stating that liabilities of a corporation am not the same as
the liabilities of shareholders).
57. See id § 14, at 432.
58. See id. at 431-432 (stating that it is generally accepted that the corporate entity is distinct from its
shareholders).
59. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 148, at 355 (3d ed. 1983).
60. For a full discussion of the doctrine of corporate veil-piercing, see PHILIP I. BLUMBERo, THE LAW OF
CORPORATE GROUPS: STATUTORY LAW-GENERAL, § 2.02 (1989).
61. See id.
62. 142 F. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).
63. See id. at 255.
64. See BLUMBERG, supra note 60, § 2.02.2 (stating that piercing the veil has three variants: instrumentality
doctrine, alter ego doctrine, and identity doctrine, and that despite different descriptions the doctrines are often
treated as the same).
65. See Richard S. Farmer, Note, Parent Corporation Responsibility for the Environmental Liabilities of
the Subsidiary: A Search for the Appropriate Standard, 19 J. CORP. L 769, 773 (1994) ("This rather vague notion
of imposing liability on shareholders when the shareholders have manipulated the corporate form has evolved into
a doctrine that cannot be cohesively articulated.") (footnote omitted); see also Birg, supra note 30, at 782 ("While
courts employ different terms and often confusing jargon when discussing piercing the corporate veil, the result
is often the same--courts ignore the corporate form.") (footnote omitted); Oswald, supra note 22, at 246
("[Pliercing doctrine is by no means precise or predictable. As a common-law doctrine based in notions of equity,
piercing doctrine has been criticized as 'defying any attempt at rational explanation' and has been described as
being 'rare, severe, and unprincipled."') (footnote omitted); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 30 (stating that veil-
piercing decisions are often rationalizations of results reached for other reasons) (footnote omitted).
66. See BLUMBERG, supra note 60, § 2.02.
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analysis include failure to adhere to corporate formalities, day-to-day control of the
subsidiary, inadequate capitalization of the subsidiary, a commingling of assets, and
use of the subsidiary for fraudulent or unjust purposes.67 Piercing is considered an
equitable and extraordinary form of relief (-a relief courts are hesitant to embrace
in the absence of exceptional and unusual circumstances.6 9
D. Past Judicial Interpretations of CERCLA 's Owner or Operator Provision
Against the bedrock principle of limited corporate liability 0 and with little
guidance from Congress, courts have been left to "breath[e] life" into CERCLA.71
Federal courts have not been consistent when interpreting CERCLA's owner or
operator provision. Prior to the Bestfoods decision, judges grappled with this issue,
the result being three' different theories of parent corporation liability, each theory
varying in the ease under which liability was found."
Different reasons have been offered to explain the courts' struggle with
CERCLA's owner or operator provision in the context of the parent corporation.
One commentator has suggested that courts struggled with the provision because of
a failure to understand and confront the key distinction under the Act-the
difference between "owner" and "operator" liability.74 Another commentator has
attributed the struggle, at least in part, to the competing principles and purposes
found in CERCLA on one hand, and principles of corporate limited liability on the
other.7" Whatever the difficulty, the circuits' three tests for parent corporation
liability involved more than mere "semantic ado about nothing" 76 -the inconsis-
tency among the tests resulted in a substantial difference in the scope of parent
corporation liability."
Each of the three theories is briefly examined and illustrated by way of a
representative case below. Although previous liability theories are not the focus of
this note,7" a background discussion of these theories is useful in understanding the
choices the Supreme Court confronted when it decided Bestfoods.
67. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 29 (stating that variety exists among veil-piercing factors and that
no single factor is determinative).
68. See Oswald, supra note 22, at 244 (footnote omitted).
69. See BLUMBERG, supra note 60, § 2.02.2.
70. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998).
71. See McKane, supra note 51, at 1653.
72. Although not widely endorsed, at least one court has recognized that a common law theory of agency
may be employed to find parent corporation liability under CERCLA. See FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668
F. Supp. 1285, 1292-93 (D. Minn. 1987).
73. For a discussion of the various theories, see infra, notes 79-127 and accompanying text.
74. See Oswald, supra note 22, at 235.
75. See McKane, supra note 51, at 1653.
76. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 120.
77. See infra notes 79-127 and accompanying text.
78. For an extensive list of past efforts reviewing the different liability theories under CERCLA before
Bestfoods, see Silecchia, supra note 6, at n.42.
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1. Capacity to Control Test
The capacity to control test has been justified on the grounds that CERCLA's
remedial purpose and sweeping scheme of liability require a broad test."9 This
standard, described as "the most frightening prospect for parent corporations,"80
attaches liability to a parent corporation when the parent had the authority or
capacity to control the actions of the subsidiary, notwithstanding actual exercise of
this authority."
One of the earliest cases to address operator liability in the parent corporation
context was Idaho v. Bunker Hill Corporation.' There, the state of Idaho sought to
recover response costs for the cleanup of mining wastes from both the company that
operated the mine, Bunker Hill, and its parent company, Gulf Resources and
Chemical Company.83 The court found Gulf liable as an operator although its
subsidiary, Bunker Hill, owned and operated the facility." Guided by Congress's
intention that those who benefited from the hazardous waste disposal must also bear
the cost, the court defined the contours of the capacity to control standard:
Gulf was in a position to be, and was, intimately familiar with hazardous waste
disposal and releases at the... facility [and] had the capacity to control such
disposal and releases... if not total reserved authority, to make decisions and
implement actions and mechanisms to prevent and abate the damage caused by
the disposal and releases of hazardous wastes at the facility."
The Bunker decision has been criticized for its failure to distinguish between
operator and owner liability, 6 but also heralded for establishing that it is the
parent's relationship to the facility, rather than the relationship to the subsidiary,
that should be the guiding factor in determining parental liability.' Nonetheless, the
failure of later courts to follow this "subtle signal,"88 and the Bunker court's
adoption of the broad "capacity to control" test rather than the narrower "actual
control" test contributed to the pre-Bestfoods mire of parent corporation liability.89
While the capacity to control theory was not widely adopted,' its well taken
criticism is found in a fundamental implication: every parent corporation could be
79. See, e.g., McKane, supra note 51, at 1654 ("The 'capacity to control' standard is a prime example of
the federal courts' willingness to look beyond CERCLA's specific language and impose liability on parent
corporations in the belief that a parent can handle this liability better than involuntary creditors.").
80. Silecchia, supra note 6, at 148 (footnote omitted).
81. See infra note 85 and accompanying quote.
82. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
83. See id. at 669.
84. See id. at 671-72. The Bunker Hill court relied, in part, upon the reasoning of United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, revd in
part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter NEPACCO]. Although the NEPACCO court considered individual
shareholder liability, not parent corporation liability, the Bunker Hill court found the reasoning instructive to
determine when a parent corporation becomes an owner or operator of a subsidiary's facility.
85. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672.
86. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 149 (footnote omitted).
87. See Oswald, supra note 22, at 261 (footnote omitted).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 262.
90. See Nurad Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (adopting the capacity
to control test in the lessor-lessee context); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338
(9th Cir. 1992) (adopting the capacity to control standard with little discussion).
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liable for a CERCLA violation by a subsidiary.9 Holding parent corporations liable
for the acts of subsidiaries based upon mere capacity to control would "radically
rewrite corporate law doctrines on parent-subsidiary relationships."' Indeed, the
Bunker Hill court was aware of the breadth of the test when it stated, "[t]he court
is mindful that in adopting the [capacity to control] test, care must be taken so that
'normal' activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do not automatically
warrant finding the parent an owner or operator."'93 Even in light of this recognition,
the court failed to clarify where the line should be drawn, and, guided by
congressional purpose, found the parent corporation liable.94
2. Actual Control Standard
In contrast with the capacity to control standard proposed by Bunker Hill, most
courts faced with the issue of direct liability of parent corporations under CERCLA
have adopted an "actual control" approach.95 Rejecting the potentially expansive
approach of the capacity to control, the actual control test looks to evidence of the
parent corporation's actual exercise of control over the subsidiary and its
activities." In these decisions, the parent's capacity to control is of no consequence
unless it was actually exercised.
The genesis of the actual control test is associated with United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp.' There, Stamina Mills, a wholly owned subsidiary of Kayser-Roth,
maintained a textile manufacturing facility from 1952 until 1975. 9" Accidental and
deliberate spills of trichlorethylene (TCE) on the Stamina property resulted in
contamination of the aquifer, and ultimately cleanup action by the EPA.9 The
district court found Kayser-Roth directly liable for the costs of the EPA cleanup and
Kayser-Roth appealed arguing that as a matter of law, a parent company of a
dissolved subsidiary cannot be held liable either as an operator or as an owner} °°
The First Circuit did not agree.10'
Affirming the lower court, the appellate court found the parent had "exerted
practical total influence and control over Stamina Mills' operations."" 2 This finding
was based upon the following evidentiary factors: (1) the parent's financial
91. See Oswald, supra note 22, at 260 (recognizing that a literal application of the test would always lead
to parent corporation liability).
92. See id. at 262.
93. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp at 672.
94. See id.
95. See John M. Brown, Comment, Parent Corporation's Liability under CERCLA Section 107 for the
Environmental Violations of Their Subsidiaries, 31 TtLA LJ. 819. 829 (1996).
96. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text. The EPA also advocated such an approach as early as
1984. See Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Monitoring, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, Associate Enforcement Counsel for Waste, Regional Administrators, and Regional Counsels
(June 13, 1984), cited in Silecchia, supra note 6, at n.107.
97. 910F.2d24(IstCir. 1990).
98. See id. at 25.
99. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. 724 F. Supp. 15, 17-18 (D.R.L 1989).
100. See Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d at 25.
101. See id. The appellate court considered only operator liability and finding that it existed, refused to
consider Kayser's arguments regarding owner liability. See id. at 28 n.1 1.
102. Id. at 27 (citing 724 F. Supp. at 18).
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domination over the subsidiary; (2) the parent's requirement that subsidiary-
governmental contact, including environmental matters, be funneled through the
parent; (3) the parent's management of the subsidiary's real estate transactions; (4)
the parent's requirement that it approve any expenditure over $5000; and (5) the
parent's placement of its personnel in almost all subsidiary's director and officer
positions. °3 In short, Kayser-Roth exercised pervasive control over its subsidiary
sufficient to support direct liability under CERCLA.'°
In articulating an operator standard, the court made two interesting points. First,
the court acknowledged its failure to articulate an exact standard for holding a
parent corporation liable as an operator under CERCLA °5 Second, the court
emphasized that it is not the usual case for a parent to be an operator of its wholly
owned subsidiary."°  Nonetheless, the court then went on to announce the actual
exercise of control test: "To be an operator requires more than merely complete
ownership and the concomitant general authority or ability to control that comes
with ownership. At a minimum it requires active involvement in the activities of the
subsidiary."'"
Although the actual control test has been used extensively in CERCLA's parent
corporation context, it has been criticized for its focus on the parent's activities with
the subsidiary, rather than focusing on the parent's activities with the facility.108
This is problematic because control of the subsidiary may give rise to indirect
liability under the veil-piercing doctrine, whereas control over the facility itself is
the more appropriate inquiry for direct liability. Interestingly, this is how the
Supreme Court viewed the issue in Bestfoods.0 9
3. Operator Liability as Indirect Liability Only
Finally, although before Bestfoods a majority of courts recognized some form of
direct, operator liability for parent corporations under CERCLA,"0 at least one
court had refused to find this form of liability for a parent corporation.
In Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L James & Co.," the Fifth Circuit held that a
parent corporation could be liable under CERCLA for the activities of its
subsidiaries only if the corporate veil was pierced."' Joslyn brought suit to recover
the cleanup costs from a creosoting plant built, owned, and operated by Lincoln
Creosoting Company." 3 Before the plant was sold to Joslyn, it had been completely
103. See id. (citing 724 F. Supp. at 22).
104. See id. at 28.
105. Seeid. at27.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See Oswald, supra note 22, at 268-69.
109. See infra Part IV.
110. See supra notes 79-109 and accompanying text.
111. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
112. One commentator observes that Joslyn has been the subject of much scholarly commentary because of
its minority status. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at n.176.
113. See Joslyn Corp. v. T.L James & Co. Inc., 696 F. Supp. 222,223-224 (W.D. La. 1988).
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controlled by T.L. James." 4 Joslyn argued that James' relationship to the subsidiary
constituted a relationship analogous to an owner or operator under CERCLA." 5
The Joslyn court's reasoning in rejecting Joslyn's argument has been described
as "one of the most pro-parent decisions ever authored.""' 6 In reaching its decision,
the court first looked to the language of CERCLA. Finding that the statutory
definition of owner or operator "[s]ignificantly... [did] not define 'owners' or
'operators' as including the parent company of offending wholly-owned subsidiar-
ies,"' 7 the court refused to follow the paths on which other circuits had extended
liability to parent corporations."' Additionally, the court found no authority in the
legislative history directing it to disregard a basic tenet of corporation law. 9
Unpersuaded by Congressional silence on the issue, the court concluded "without
an express congressional directive to the contrary, common-law principles of
corporation law, such as limited liability, govern our court's analysis."'2 As
discussed below, the Sixth Circuit, in part, followed the reasoning of Joslyn in
United States v. Cordova Chemical,' a view the Supreme Court later rejected in
Bestfoods.
The veil-piercing only standard was supported by several arguments, but accom-
panied by its own flaws.' First, veil-piercing was compatible with congressional
silence on creating a new principle of corporate liability.' Veil-piercing refused
to "court-create" CERCLA liability without explicit statutory authority. Second,
the rule was in compliance with the expectations of the corporate form, a form
based upon the concept of limited liability."2 However, requiring that the corporate
veil be pierced before holding a parent corporation liable had its faults. Piercing the
corporate veil can prove to be extremely difficult. 2 This presents a hurdle to
effectuating CERCLA's broad remedial goal of making those responsible for the
pollution pay for the consequences of their pollution.'26 Moreover, this approach
also disregards Congress's inclusion of "operator" within CERCLA, and instead
focuses on "owner" liability. 27 Thus, while the minority standard did not require
an expansive view of CERCLA, the creation of definitions omitted in the statute,
or a change in the traditional notions of the corporate form, it failed to take into
account CERCLA's broad remedial goal and the stated dual standard of liability.
It was in the midst of these conflicting interpretations that the Bestfoods saga
began.
114. See Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 81.
115. See id. at 82.
116. See John S.G. Worden, CERCLA liability of Parent Corporations for the Acts of Their Subsidiaries,
30 IDAHo L REv. 73,79 (1993-94).
117. Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 82.
118. See id. at 82-83.
119. Seeid. at82.
120. ld. at 83 (citing Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201,843 F.2d 1427, 1430 (D.C. Cir.
1988)).
121. 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cit. 1997). The Cordova case is discussed infra, Part Ill.
122. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 154-56.
123. See id. at 154.
124. See id. at 154-55.
125. See id. at 155.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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Im. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Relevant Facts
Chemical manufacturing began at the plant site near Muskegon, Michigan in
1957.'2' The first owner, Ott Chemical Company (Ott 1) operated the site from 1957
until 1965.129 Prior to the chemical manufacturing operations, the groundwater
underlying the site was considered to be of excellent quality. 3 ° However, during
Ott's control the intentional and unintentional dumping of hazardous substances
contaminated groundwater flowing underneath the site and soil surrounding the
site.13' The contamination was confirmed by tests conducted in 1964.132
In 1965 CPC International Inc.'33 incorporated a wholly owned subsidiary (Ott
11) to buy Ott I's assets. 3 4 CPC retained officers of Ott I as officers of Ott II,
including Ott I's founder, principal shareholder, and president, Arnold Ott. 35 Mr.
Ott and several other officers and directors were also given positions at CPC. These
officers and directors performed duties for both corporations.
136
The new company, Ott Chemical Company (Ott 11) also manufactured
chemicals.'37 Despite the intermittent use of purge wells, the pollution of soil,
surface water, and groundwater continued.138 The primary cause of contamination
was the use of unlined lagoons as a means of chemical waste disposal from 1959
until at least 1968.139 Other sources of contamination included chemical spills from
train cars, chemical drums, and a cement-lined equalization basin."4 Ultimately, the
contamination migrated through the aquifer and reached two waterways. 4'
The Story Chemical Company purchased the site from CPC in 1972.142 Story
continued chemical manufacturing at the site until its bankruptcy in 1977.43 The
trustee in bankruptcy assumed title and attempted to find a buyer."
Shortly after Story's bankruptcy, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR) inspected the site to determine the extent of environmental problems and
possible remedies. 45 MDNR described the site's environmental problems as
"legion".'" Decades of hazardous waste contamination had left "'groundwater'
128. See U.S. v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.2d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 1997).
129. See id. at 575.
130. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corporation, 777 F. Supp. 549, 555 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
131. See id. at 555-56.
132. See id. at 555.
133. As noted above, CPC changed its name to Bestfoods. See supra note 11.
134. See CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 557.
135. See id. at 558.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 556.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. The waterways are Little Bear Creek and the Unnamed Tributary.
142. See id. at 555.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 562.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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contain[ing] foam [of] a brownish color like root beer[,j . . . [t]he stench of
chemicals permeat[ing] the air, [s]oil... showing purplish colors[, h]undreds of
chemical drums . . . strewn among trees [on the site] . . . [that] were crushed,
corroded and leaking, with their contents seeping into the ground[,] ... , [and] tanks
of explosive phosgene gas, potentially deadly if released into the air." '147 MDNR
sought a buyer willing to contribute toward the remediation of the Muskegon
facility.'48 After extensive negotiations, 49 Aerojet-General Corporation (Aerojet)
arranged for transfer of the property from the Story bankruptcy trustee in 1977.15
Aerojet created a wholly-owned Californian subsidiary, Cordova Chemical
Company (Cordova California) to purchase the property. In turn, Cordova
California created a wholly owned Michigan subsidiary, Cordova Chemical
Company of Michigan (Cordova Michigan), which manufactured chemicals at the
site until 1986.'
By 1982, the Environmental Protection Agency had committed to cleaning up the
site.52 The site and the surrounding area ranked 137th on the National Priorities
List. 53 The cleanup plan called for expenditures into the tens of millions of
dollars. 54 To recover some of that money, the United States filed an action under
CERCLA in 1989, naming five defendants as responsible parties: CPC, Aerojet,
Cordova California, Cordova Michigan, and Arnold Ott.'55
After the parties "launched a flurry of contribution claims, counterclaims, and
cross-claims" the district court consolidated the cases for trial in three phases:
liability, remedy, and insurance coverage. 56 The court held a fifteen-day bench trial
on the issue of liability and as a result of party stipulations, the trial focused on the
issues of whether CPC and Aerojet, as the parent corporations of Ott II and the
Cordova Companies, had owned or operated the facility within the meaning of §
107(a)(2) of CERCLA.'57
B. The District Court's Conclusions
Under the pretext of CERCLA's remedial purpose,' the district court found that
liability may attach to a parent corporation in two ways: first, liability can attach
directly, when the parent itself operates the facility; 59 second, liability can attach
147. Id. at 562-63.
148. See id. at 563.
149. See id. at 563-67 (describing the negotiations).
150. See id. at 564.
151. See id. at 555.
152. See id. at 556.
153. See id For a brief description of the National Priorities List see SCHOENBAUM & ROSENBERG supra note
17.
154. See U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 57 (1998).
155. Ott I and H were by then defunct. Arnold Ott settled out of court with the government before the trial.
See id. at 58 n.6.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 572 (W.D. Mich. 1991) ("reading the statute to employ only traditional
concepts of ownership and liability through veil-piercing would require the court to ignore not only the statute's
broadly remedial intent, but also its explicit words.") (footnote omitted).
159. See id.
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indirectly, when the corporate veil can be pierced under state law.16' In finding that
CERCLA may impose direct liability in situations in which the corporate veil
cannot be pierced under traditional concepts of corporate law, the court noted that
CERCLA does not reject "the crucial limits to liability that are inherent to corporate
law."16' Rather, the court found CERCLA's owned or operated language forged a
"new, middle ground" of liability. 62 The court's "new, middle ground"1 63 of
liability required a parent corporation to actively participate in and exercise control
over the subsidiary's business during a period of disposal of hazardous waste.'"
However, the court stated, parental oversight consistent with an investment
relationship will not give rise to operator liability. 65 The court identified several
factors helpful in determining whether a parent corporation operated its subsidiary
for the purpose of CERCLA liability.1 66 These factors included the parent
corporation's involvement in the board of directors, management, daily operations,
and certain policy matters, including the area of waste disposal. 67 Applying these
factors to the case before it, the court found both CPC and Aerojet liable as
operators.1
61
In addition, the court found that a parent corporation may be held indirectly liable
as an owner if the traditional state law standard for veil-piercing is satisfied.'69 As
to CPC, the court found it unnecessary to reach the question of veil-piercing,
160. See id. at 574.
161. See id. at 573.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See id. The court further elaborated:
[A] parent corporation is directly liable under section 107(a)(2) as an operator only when it has
exerted power or influence over its subsidiary by actively participating in and exercising control
over the subsidiary's business during a period of disposal of hazardous waste. A parent's actual
participation in and control over a subsidiary's functions and decision-making creates 'operator'
liability under CERCLA; a parent's mere oversight of a subsidiary's business in a manner
appropriate and consistent with the investment relationship between a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary does not.
Id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. The court also stated:
In addition, determining the origin and business function of the subsidiary in the context of the
parent corporation's business may be helpful in determining whether the parent has operated
a wholly owned subsidiary. Other evidence may be less probative if it is simply indicative of the
actions of a prudent investor, rather than an active operator, including monitoring of a
subsidiary's financial performance, consolidation of corporate business matters such as
accounting and legal work, and cooperation between the subsidiary and the parent in research.
In the final analysis, each case must be decided on its own unique facts and circumstances.
Id.
168. See id. at 575, 580. The court found eight factors probative in finding CPC liable as an operator. See
id. at 575. Similarly, the court found eleven factors probative in finding Aerojet liable. See id. at 579.
169. See id. at 574. The court cited Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir.
1991) for authority in using state law veil-piercing. The court outlined the inquiry for veil-piercing under Michigan
law as being "the -subsidiary has been a mere instrumentality of the parent, that the separateness between the
corporations has been used to commit fraud or wrong, and that unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff has occurred."
CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 574 (citations omitted). The court also found that "[i]t. .. may be appropriate under
some circumstances to pierce the veil of a separate corporate entity to serve the interests of justice when an
individual is the sole shareholder of a corporation, as in the case of a parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary." Id. (citations omitted).
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labeling it an alternative theory of liability, because CPC had been held directly
liable under an operator standard. 70 The court did, however, apply the veil-piercing
standard to Aerojet.' 7 ' Finding Aerojet indirectly liable, the court stated "Aerojet
totally dominated Cordova/Michigan, creating a complete identity of interests
between the parent and the wholly owned subsidiary."' The Sixth Circuit next
considered the district court's two theories of liability.
C. District Court Reversed in Part by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit
A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, 7 granted
rehearing en banc, and vacated the panel decision."" On rehearing, the court again
reversed in part.'75
The appellate court noted that Congress intended CERCLA to be a remedial
statute, as such its goals were not to be frustrated by judicial interpretation. 176 Yet,
the court also recognized that CERCLA should not be interpreted over-broadly,
"snar[ing] those who are either innocently or tangentially tied to the facility at
issue." '177 The court concluded that the district court had done just that.'
The appellate court criticized the lower court opinion for its articulation of the
"new, middle ground" basis for liability and for its lack of clarity.'79 Accordingly,
the court rejected the lower court's analysis, finding it unsupported by CERCLA.180
In the alternative, the court found that when a parent corporation is sought to be
held liable as an operator based upon the extent of its control of the subsidiary
owning the facility, liability can only attach when the corporate veil can be
pierced.'
The majority did, however, acknowledge the possibility that a parent corporation
might be held directly liable as an operator of the facility owned by the
subsidiary.'82 The court found that parent liability depended upon the degree to
which the parent controls the subsidiary and the extent and manner of its involve-
ment with the facility. 3 According to the court, involvement must have amounted
to an abuse of the corporate form in order for direct liability to attach.8 4
In summary, the appellate court recognized three ways in which a parent may be
held liable as an owner or operator: 1) indirectly, as an owner, by piercing the
corporate veil; 2) as an operator where the parent directly operates the facility itself,
170. See id. at 575.
171. See id. at578.
172. Id.
173. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995).
174. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995).
175. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997).
176. See id. at 577.
177. See id. at 578.
178. See id. at 581-83.
179. See id. at 579.
180. See id at 579-80 (quoting Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990)).
181. See id. at 580.
182. See id. at 581 (stating "[a]lthough a parent conceivably could be held liable under this theory...
183. See id. at 580.
184. See id.
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either independently of its subsidiary, or as an actual "co-operator" alongside the
subsidiary; or 3) directly, as an operator, by piercing the veil.'
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'86 in this case to resolve the
split among the Circuits on the issue of parent corporation liability.'87 By way of a
unanimous opinion authored by Justice Souter, the Court held that there are two
theories under which a parent corporation may be found liable for the acts of its
subsidiaries under CERCLA. Under the first theory, the Court agreed with the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion that only when the corporate veil can be pierced will a parent
corporation be held indirectly liable under CERCLA's owner provision for the acts
of its subsidiaries.'8 8 However, the Court failed to discuss whether courts should
apply a federal or state veil-piercing standard.'89 Under the second theory, the Court
found that direct liability will attach to a parent corporation when the parent acts as
an operator of the facility itself."9
A. Owner Liability
The Court began its analysis by affirmatively reciting the "bedrock principle" of
corporate law that a parent corporation is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.19'
It is "hornbook law," the Court said, that control consistent with stock ownership
cannot give rise to liability beyond the assets of the subsidiary.' 92 Although the
Court recognized that this principle has been. severely criticized,' 93 it also
recognized that nothing in CERCLA purports to rewrite such a deeply ingrained
principle. In fact, the Court stated, "congressional silence is audible."' ' 4
The Court acknowledged the "equally fundamental" principle of corporate veil
piercing permitting a shareholder to be held liable for the corporation's conduct
when "the corporate form would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain
wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder's behalf."' 95 Generally,
in order to abrogate a principle of common law, the Court stated, a statute must
directly speak to the issue. 96 Just as CERCLA is notably silent on its intention to
rewrite the principle of limited corporate liability, it is equally silent on rewriting
the well-accepted rule of veil piercing. 9' The Supreme Court, therefore, found the
185. See id. at 581.
186. See United States v. Bestfoods 522 U.S. 1024 (1997).
187. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 60 (1998).
188. See id. at 61-62.
189. See id. at 61; infra, Part V.B.1
190. See id. at 62.
191. See id. at 61 (citations omitted).
192. See id. at 61-62.
193. See id. at 62 (citing Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and
Damages, cited supra note 6).
194. Id.
195. See id. (citation omitted).
196. See id. at 63 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
197. See id.
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court of appeals correct in holding that a parent may be charged with derivative
liability for its subsidiary's actions only when the corporate veil can be pierced.19
B. The Direct/Operator Analysis
The Court's second avenue to parental liability is the heart of the decision. Not
only does it present a much more interesting and less predictable path,'99 it brings
clarity to the question of a parent corporation's operator liability under CERCLA,
an issue that has plagued the courts since NEPACCO, one of the earliest CERCLA
cases.
200
The Court followed the veil-piercing analysis by noting that CERCLA liability
may also turn on operator, as well as owner status.2°" The Court found nothing in
CERCLA barring a parent corporation from direct liability for its own actions in
operating a facility owned by its subsidiary.' 2 Citing an article written by Justice
Douglas," 3 the Court stated that derivative liability cases are to be distinguished
from those cases in which the parent participates directly in the wrong." 4 In these
cases, the parent should be directly liable for its own actions, even if the subsidiary
owns the polluting facility.2"5 In this instance, the corporate relationship is to be
disregarded if the acts of pollution were done on behalf of the parent; accordingly,
the parent-subsidiary relationship is irrelevant to the issue of direct liability. 6
Thus, unlike derivative liability stemming from traditional veil piercing, CERCLA
provides for direct liability under an operator theory, as was at issue in this case.2°
Recognizing the difficulty in defining operator for the purpose of CERCLA and
commenting on the "uselessness"" 8 of CERCLA's circular definition of the term,
the Court turned to the term's ordinary and natural meaning.20 9 The Court, guided
by dictionary definitions, stated that in a mechanical sense, operate means "[t]o
control the functioning of; run: operate a sewing machine"2"'or "to work; as, to
operate a machine." 211 In an organizational sense, operate means "to conduct affairs
of; manage: operate a business" 212or "to manage."' 13 The Court concluded that
under CERCLA, "an operator is simply someone who directs the workings of,
198. See id at 63-64. The Court recognized that there is some disagreement among courts and commentators
over whether state or federal law applies to veil piercing. See id. at 63 n.9. As the question was not presented, the
Court did not address it further. For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part V.B. 1.
199. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 170.
200. See Oswald, supra note 22, at 243 (stating "NEPACCO I, the first major CERCLA liability case, started
CERCLA jurisprudence off on the wrong foot.").
201. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 64; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
202. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 64.
203. As the Court noted, Justice Douglas wrote the article before his appointment to the Court. See id. at
n.ll.
204. See id. at 65 (citation omitted).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 66 ("[hlere of course we may again rue the uselessness of CERCLA's definition of a facility's
'operator' as 'any person... operating' the faciity"(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii)).
209. See id. (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)).
210. Id. (citing American Heritage Dictionary 1268 (3d ed. 1992))(emphasis omitted).
211. Id. (citing Webster's New International Dictionary 1707 (2d ed. 1958)) (emphasis omitted).
212. Id. (citing American Heritage Dictionary 1268 (3d ed. 1992))(emphasis omitted).
213. Id. (citing Webster's New International Dictionary 1707 (2d ed. 1958)).
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manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility." '214 Sharpening the definition for
purposes of CERCLA's concern with environmental contamination, "an operator
must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is,
operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or
decisions about compliance with environmental regulations." '215
In light of this definition, the Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit's rejection of
the district court's finding of direct liability." 6 One of the two problems with the
district court's analysis, said the Court, lay in the court's application of the actual
control test to determine whether the parent operated the subsidiary.217
Using this opportunity to analyze the actual control test, the Court found the test
objectionable because of the test's melding of direct and indirect liability.218
According to the Court, the actual control test incorrectly examined the relationship
between the parent and subsidiary corporation.2"9 This analysis, the Court stated, is
more appropriate under a theory of indirect liability.22 ° Instead, the district court
should have examined the parent's interaction with the subsidiary's facility, which
is the proper inquiry for direct liability.22 The Court reasoned that if the two
liabilities were to remain distinct, the focus of the inquiry must necessarily be
different under the two tests:
The question is not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, but whether it
operates the facility, and that operation is evidenced by participation in the
activities of the facility, not the subsidiary. Control of the subsidiary, if
extensive enough, gives rise to indirect liability under piercing doctrine, not
direct liability under the statutory language.222
Thus, the district court's analysis should not have turned on CPC's controlling
relationship with Ott II but should have examined the relationship between CPC and
the Muskegon facility itself.
223
The Court saw another problem with the district court's decision in that it failed
to recognize that corporate personalities may remain distinct.224 The Court stated
that well established principles of corporate law allowed directors and officers of
both a parent and a subsidiary to "'change hats' to represent the corporations
separately, despite their common ownership."" 5 The fact that persons were wearing
dual hats does not necessarily expose the parent corporation to liability for its
subsidiaries' acts. 6 In fact, the judicial presumption is that directors are wearing
214. Id.
215. Id. at 66-67.
216. See id. at 67.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 68.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Id. (quoting Oswald, supra note 22, at 269).
223. See id.
224. See id. at 69.
225. See id. (quoting Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1997)).
226. See id.
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a subsidiary hat when acting for a subsidiary.227 In order to establish liability it was
not enough to show that dual officers directed the facility, rather, the government
would have had to show, over the general presumption to the contrary, that officers
and directors were acting in the capacity of the parent corporation directors and not
the capacity of subsidiary directors when the relevant acts were committed.228 The
Court found that the district court's failure to inquire into this disregarded a well-
established common law rule.
229
The Court reasoned that if evidence of commingled corporate personalities were
sufficient to support parent direct liability under CERCLA, veil-piercing would be
"academic".23° The result would be a relaxed, CERCLA specific rule that would in
effect circumscribe traditional principles and expectations from the law of
CERCLA liability, a task that CERCLA's silence cannot accomplish.23'
Turning to the Sixth Circuit's analysis, the Court found that though the appellate
court was correct in rejecting the district court's broad interpretation, the appellate
court's holding was too narrow.232 Specifically, the Court took issue with the
appellate court's finding on circumstances in which operator liability may attach.233
By confining its examples of direct parental operation to sole or joint ventures, the
appellate court failed to realize the breadth of the operator provision under
CERCLA.234 Thus, in addition to the scenario envisioned by the appellate court, the
Court anticipated two more scenarios giving rise to parent liability.235 The first was
addressed earlier in the opinion and arises when a dual officer or director departs
from the norms of parental influence and dual officeholding and acts, though
ostensibly for the subsidiary, on behalf of the parent to operate the facility.236 The
second possibility, suggested by the facts of Bestfoods itself, was that an agent of
the parent and not of the subsidiary was extensively involved with environmental
activities at the facility.
237
The Court acknowledged that this exercise calls for line drawing and instructed
that norms of corporate behavior should serve as critical reference points.238 These
norms serve to identify oversight oriented activities, while at the same time
identifying control oriented activities.239 In drawing a line, the critical examination
becomes whether the action taken by the agent of a parent is eccentric with the point
of reference as the accepted norms of parent corporation oversight.24
227. See id.
228. See id. at 69-70.
229. See id. at 70.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 71.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id. An account of the agent's (Williams') role is found in CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 561.
238. See BesOfoods, 524 U.S. at 71.
239. See id. at 71-72.
240. See id. at 72 (lhe critical question is whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by
an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility.").
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Finding some evidence that CPC engaged in questionable activity at the plant,
the Court remanded the case."4 Of interest to the Court was the district court's
finding that a CPC agent participated in waste disposal activities at Ott H.242 This
agent, Williams, worked only for CPC, not Ott II. Therefore, his actions were
necessarily taken on the behalf of CPC. In fact, it was through Williams that CPC
became directly involved in the environmental affairs of Ott ll." Moreover,
Williams had substantial involvement in the environmental affairs of Ott II.7
From the Court's perspective, the activity of Williams was enough to raise issues
of CPC's status as an operator.2 45 The Court exercised judicial restraint in
remanding the case to the lower court for reevaluation of Williams role, or any other
CPC agent who may have had a part in operating the facility.'
V. IMPLICATIONS OF BESTFOODS
A. Overview
Bestfoods constitutes the Court's first substantive ruling on the question of
CERCLA liability since the act's passage.47 Independent of this status, the signifi-
cance of Bestfoods is readily apparent because it is in agreement with CERCLA's
language, CERCLA's goals, and strikes a balance between competing theories of
liability offered by the lower courts.
First, in recognizing two distinct theories of liability, the decision is in agreement
with the language of CERCLA. Through the use of the disjunctive "or," CERCLA's
"owner or operator" provision envisions two theories of liability. It follows that two
theories of liability demand two distinct standards of liability.' The owner liability
theory requires an examination of the relationship between the parent and the
subsidiary. By way of a different analysis, the operator liability theory looks to the
parent's control of the physical facility from which liability stems. This conforms
to the language of CERCLA which places liability on the "owner or operator" of a
"facility," not the corporate relationship between a parent and subsidiary. 9
Second, the decision also adheres to CERCLA's goals while simultaneously
respecting traditional notions of corporate limited liability. CERCLA's stated goal
of holding responsible parties liable for the costs of cleanup implies that parties
should be responsible only for their own actions, not the actions of others. The
Court's operator standard directly effectuates this goal by focusing on the amount
241. See id. at 73.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 73 n.14 (citing the lower court at 777 F. Supp. at 561).
244. See id. at 72 ("[Williams] actively participated in and exerted control over ... environmental matters
• .. issued directives regarding Ott H's responses to regulatory inquiries.") (citing CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 575).
245. See id.
246. The Court refused to make conclusions. The Court's reluctance to make conclusions was based upon
the fact that it would be making the finding in the first instance and the fact that the district court did not apply the
correct standard. See id. at 72-73. At the date of this writing, there has been no decision on remand.
247. See Lisa K. Seilheimer, October 1997 Term: United States v. Bestfoods, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 303 (1998)(citation omitted).
248. See Oswald, supra note 23, at 279-280 (discussing the need for bifurcation of the two distinct concepts).
249. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 172.
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of responsibility the parent corporation actually undertook with respect to hazardous
waste at a facility. Only when a parent corporation assumes responsibility such that
it is committing the actual release, should it be liable as an operator. This is in direct
conformity with CERCLA's goal of "let the polluter pay"2" rather than the
taxpayer. If the parent corporation's involvement was limited to a corporate
relationship with the subsidiary, however, in keeping with limited corporate
liability, the parent corporation should not be forced to assume responsibility for
actions that were not its own. Accordingly, as the Court reasoned, it should not be
held liable unless the corporate veil can be pierced.
Third, by adhering to CERCLA's language the decision strikes a balance
between the varying theories of liabilities previously offered by the courts. 251 It
expands on the too-narrow scope of liability under which only veil-piercing was
sufficient. This prevents a parent corporation from placing ownership of a facility
in a "valid" subsidiary, managing the site for its own benefit, and then hiding behind
the corporate veil.252 At the same time it narrows the expansive liability under which
capacity to control was sufficient. This allows a parent to act consistently with its
investor status by enabling it to engage in issues of financial oversight and articulate
general policies without incurring liability.253 Moreover, no longer will operator
liability be contingent on the particular jurisdiction in which the action is tried. The
Court's articulation has the potential to guide lower courts in creating a uniform test
of parental liability, not dependent upon which court is hearing the case. This
should serve to curb varied judicial pronouncements that have piqued concern that
the lower court's disparate decisions "will only lead to greater confusion. 2 54
B. Questions Left Unanswered By Bestfoods
While the Bestfoods decision adheres to statutory language, CERCLA's goals,
and the principle of limited liability, it leaves related issues unresolved. First, the
decision fails to address whether state or federal law governs the veil-piercing
necessary for indirect liability. Second, the decision offers little guidance to
government agencies, corporations, and courts trying to assess the proper role of a
parent corporation's relationship with its subsidiary and facility. Third, the decision
may affect future relationships between parent corporations and the facilities of
their subsidiaries. Even though CERCLA liability is backward looking,255 the
decision encourages CERCLA concerned parent corporations to adopt a future
"hands off' approach with respect to the facilities of their subsidiaries.
250. See id at 116 (footnote omitted).
251. See Besfoods, 524 U.S. at 60 (stating that the Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the
Circuits); see also supra, Part I1. (discussing three different court-created tests before Bestfoods).
252. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 172-73.
253. See Seilheimer, supra note 247.
254. See Thomas R. Mounteer & Michael J. Myers, CERCLA does not articulate whether shareholders and
parent corporations can be liable under Supetfund; as a result, federal circuit courts are in conflict, NAT'L L.,
Sept. 22, 1997, at B4.
255. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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1. Veil-Piercing Standard: State or Federal?
While the Court's treatment of the "owner or operator" distinction was a
welcome addition to CERCLA jurisprudence, the Court acknowledged, but left
undecided, the disagreement of what law should govern veil-piercing in assessing
indirect parental liability.2" Relegating this issue to a footnote, the Court concluded
that because the question had not been challenged by the parties or presented in the
case, it would not be addressed.257 Thus, the Court left unanswered a question that
has already been the subject of some debate in the CERCLA arena.25
Before Bestfoods, writers and courts confronted with the choice of law issue in
CERCLA veil-piercing actions have taken different approaches.259 A minority of
federal courts has been slow to replace the use of state law in the corporate veil-
piercing context.2' Some courts and observers have found that from a practical
standpoint, the outcome is unlikely to differ whether courts apply a federal rule or
state rule."' The majority of courts, however, have analyzed the issue under federal
common law. 262
Federal courts have the ability to develop and apply federal common law when
interpreting federal statutes.263 This is generally true only when Congress has
expressly granted them the power to do so, or if a federal rule of decision is
"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests."' 2" Like many other issues
involving CERCLA, Congress did not address whether state or federal common law
should apply in veil-piercing actions under CERCLA.265 Moreover, the legislative
history is of little assistance.' The only evidence exists in a statement made by the
CERCLA House Sponsor, Congressman Florio, "[t]o insure the development of a
uniform rule of law, and to discourage business dealings in hazardous substances
from locating primarily in States with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the
256. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63-64 n.9.
257. See id.
258. See, e.g., Silecchia, supra note 6, at 175 (stating "[w]hether the interest in deferring to state corporate
law outweighs the government's and parties' interest in uniformity is a difficult question with serious
ramifications"); see also supra note 256.
259. See supra note 256 (citing the approach taken by different courts.) Writers advocating a state veil-
piercing standard include: Silecchia, supra note 6, at 190-92; Richard G. Dennis, Liability of Officers, Directors
and Stockholders Under CERCLA: The Case for Adopting State Law, 36 VIL. L REv. 1367 (1991); and Dana
Lee, Should CERCLA Liability for Limited Partnerships Be Governed by State or Federal Law?, 17 J. LAND
RESOURCEs & ENVTL L 367 (1997). Writers advocating the use of federal law include: Azvnovsky & Fuller, supra
note 9; Birg, supra note 30; Note, supra note 6; and Jay A. McKendree, Appropriate Federal Rules of Veil-
Piercing in Response to United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub
nora., United States v. CPC Int'l, 118 S. Ct. 621 (Dec. 12,1997) (No. 97-454), 23 U. DAYTON L REv. 419 (1998).
260. See, e.g., Cordova Cher., 113 F.3d at 575.
261. See, e.g., Oswald, supra note 23, at 247; In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675
F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987).
262. See Cordova Chem, 113 F.3d at 585, (Merritt, concurring in part and dissenting in part)(collecting
cases).
263. See United States v. Kimbell Foods Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979).
264. See Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,640 (1981).
265. See Brown, supra note 95, at 834 (declaring that the "[c]ontroversy over whether to apply state or
federal veil piercing standards exists because CERCLA's liability provisions are vague.") (footnote omitted).
266. See Dennis, supra note 259, at 1446 ("Neither the CERCLA statute nor its legislative history contain
any express indication of congresional intent concerning choice of law on direct liability or piercing the corporate
veil.") (footnote omitted).
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further development of a Federal common law in this area."'267 Some have argued
that this statement is evidence of Congressional preference for the application of
federal law.26 However, at least one commentator has argued that Representative
Florio was addressing the issue of joint and several liability and therefore no
evidence of Congressional intent to apply federal law can be gleaned from his
statement.269
The case for applying a federal common law is guided by the standards for the
development of federal common law rules as articulated in United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc.271 Under the holding of that case, federal courts must balance several
factors in determining whether federal common law applies.27" ' The court must first
determine whether there is a need for a nationally uniform body of law; second,
whether the application of state law frustrates the special objectives of the federal
program; and third, whether application of a federal rule will disrupt commercial
relationships predicated on state law.27 2 Under the Kimbell standard, a federal rule
of veil-piercing in CERCLA should be followed.
Under the first Kimbell factor, CERCLA is a program that must be uniform
throughout the nation, and, of equal importance, the standard of indirect liability
must be unvaried throughout the nation. Uniform interpretations are necessary to
effectuate uniform objectives. This idea was captured best in the oft-quoted passage
from In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB
Pollution:273 "[In attempting to eliminate the dangers of hazardous wastes,
CERCLA presents a national solution to a nationwide problem. One can hardly
imagine a federal program more demanding of national uniformity than environ-
mental protection. 274 Because CERCLA's standard of owner liability must be
interpreted uniformly throughout the nation, a federal rule of veil-piercing should
be followed.
Under the second Kimbell factor, the use of state law and its attending
discrepancies can work to frustrate the specific objectives of CERCLA. The stated
objective of CERCLA is to provide for clean-up of hazardous waste and to hold
267. 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980).
268. See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 1000; Cordova ChenL,113 F.3d at 583 (Merritt, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
269. See Dennis, supra note 259, at 1446 (footnote omitted).
270. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
271. See id. at 728.
272. See id. at 728-729.
273. 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987).
274. Id. at 31. The Acushnet River court considered veil-piercing in the context of jurisdiction, not
substantive liability. Another important reason arguing for federal law is the lack of uniformity presented by state
law. Acushnet River also acknowledged this problem:
Congress did not intend that the ability of the executive to fund the clean up of hazardous waste
sites should depend on the attitude of the several states toward parent-subsidiary liability in
general, or CERCLA in particular. The need for a uniform federal rule is especially great for
questions of piercing the corporate veil, since liability under the statute must not depend on the
particular state in which a defendant happens to reside.
Id. at 31.
Yet another reason stems from convenience. Parent corporations owning several or more subsidiaries benefit
from a uniformly structured corporate relationship rather than a structure dependent on states' varied piercing
standards.
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responsible parties liable for the clean-up.27 State law has the potential to frustrate
this important objective in a number of ways.
First, state common law veil-piercing tradition has developed in a variety of
unrelated contexts. 76 Veil-piercing jurisprudence is often applied without regard
to the particular issue before the court. Generic veil-piercing law fails to take into
account the primary federal concerns in each case.277 Second, there is a strong
public policy concern driving CERCLA that is notably absent in the common law
controversies such as contract and tort, which gives rise to veil-piercing.27 The
emergency situation addressed by CERCLA did not exist at the time that state veil-
piercing was developed 79 A new context, taking into account CERCLA's purpose,
more appropriately serves its goals. This end is best served by applying a federal
veil-piercing standard. Third, there are many and important variations among state
veil-piercing doctrines. 28 This can lead to dissimilar results, where liability is not
based in culpability but geographic location.28 Different states have adopted widely
divergent, even contradictory, standards when analyzing the corporate veil.2"2
Commentators in this field generally point to "main" factors, but there is still a
noticeable variety that could lead to inconsistent results.28 3 Finally, the use of state
law could frustrate CERCLA's objectives in other ways. For example, if indirect
liability hinges on state law, corporations may find it beneficial to incorporate in
states with more stringent standards for piercing the veil.2 Moreover, this might
lead the defendant to shop for a better possible result in another forum.28 Therefore,
because state veil-piercing law arose in unrelated contexts, fails to take into account
CERCLA's unique goals, and varies from state to state, state law may frustrate the
specific objectives of CERCLA.
Some commentators have advocated the position that because corporations are
"creatures" of state law, the application of state veil-piercing law more properly
adheres to the expectations of corporations which have formed and operated under
275. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
276. See BLUMBERG, supra note 60, § 2.02.2.
277. See id § 2.04.3, at 61. According to the author, it is "fundamentally wrong" to determine legal problems
without taking into account the legal policies and objectives behind the governing law. See id § 2.04.4, at 62.
278. See id. (citing Judge Friendly's statement in Bowater S.S. Co. v. Patterson, 303 F.2d 369, 372-73 (2d.
Cit. 1962): "the issues in each case must be resolved in the light of the policy underlying the applicable legal rule,
whether of statute or common law").
279. See Kamie Frischknecht Brown, Note, Parent Corporation Liability for Subsidiary Violations Under
SECTION 107 of CERCLA: Responding to United States v. Cordova Chemical Company, 1998 BYU L REv. 265,
285 (1998).
280. See BLUMBERG, supra note 60, § 2.04.04, at 63, stating:
Although traditional 'piercing the veil jurisprudence' is still accepted as a general principle of
corporate jurisprudence, thede are important variations among the doctrines of the several states.
Because of these variations between the different state versions of 'piercing the veil,' reference
to state law would inevitably lead to the undesirable result of a lack of uniform application of
federal statutes."
281. See id.
282. See Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95
HARV. L REv. 853, 855 (1982) (citing 1 WILlAM MEADE FLErCHER ET AL, F.EtcHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (rev. perm. ed. 1974)) (collecting cases).
283. See BLUMBERG, supra text accompanying note 280; Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 29-30.
284. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
285. See Brown, supra note 95, at 284; McKane, supra note 51, at 788: ("Another consequence is forum
shopping because plaintiffs will take each potential forum's veil piercing standard into account before filing suit.").
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those laws."6 While decisions and risks may be based upon expectations under state
law, only in the rarest of circumstances will such an expectation be undercut. A
federal rule of decision will not create a radically new standard unknown to
corporations, but will "borrow" from existing state law standards as it has in the
past,27 to create a CERCLA-relevant standard. A possibility exists for interference
with a corporation's expectations, relative to CERCLA, where the corporation
anticipated dodging CERCLA liability under a particular state's law. This surely
cannot comport with Congress' intention in enacting CERCLA.
The third Kimbell factor urges the same result. Admittedly, the application of a
federal rule may affect commercial relationships predicated on state law, but it
should not disrupt them.28 Both commentators and courts alike have recognized that
state law governs the internal workings and affairs of the corporation,29 but that
external affairs may be governed by the law of the forum.29 Internal workings may
include things such as voting rights and the relationship of officers, directors, and
shareholders, 29' while external affairs include the rights of third parties.2' Because
the rights of the federal government and parties affected by a Superfund site fall
within an external classification, relationships based on state law will not be
disrupted by CERCLA's interest in hazardous waste clean-up.
Yet, there are several difficulties with adopting a federal veil-piercing standard.
One can look to past efforts at applying a federal standard to find non-uniformity
in the standard.293 Federal law in the veil-piercing area is not as well developed as
state law.294 Moreover, a federal standard may take time to develop into a body of
law yielding consistent results.295 Whether state or federal law is applied, veil-
piercing leads to non-uniform results, 296 and if there is the potential to find a
uniform rule of liability for parent owners, it is under a federal rule of decision.
In summary, the application of a federal rule of veil-piercing is warranted, and
needed, under CERCLA.
286. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 190 ("[A]pplying state veil-piercing law best respects the expectations
of parents and subsidiaries who rely on a long tradition of state law as the applicable rule") (footnote omitted).
287. See, e.g., Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33 (noting that the federal common law draws heavily upon
state law for guidance).
288. See Note, supra note 6, at 1000.
289. See Note, supra note 282, at 862; Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31.
290. See Note, supra note 282, at 862.
291. See McKendree, supra note 259, at 429 (footnote omitted).
292. See Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31.
293. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 9, at 460 (stating that federal courts are a long way from agreeing
on a standard).
294. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 191 (footnote omitted); see also Sung Bae Kim, A Comparison of the
Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil in The United States and in South Korea, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L
73, 78 (1995) (stating that one reason that veil-piercing under federal common law is uncertain is the Supreme
Court's failure to set a standard) (footnote omitted).
295. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 191 (arguing that years would be necessary to clearly articulate a federal
standard) (footnote omitted).
296. See BLUMBERG, supra note 60, § 2.02.2, at 40 (stating that hundreds of piercing decisions are
"irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible"); see also Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 30 (stating that veil-piercing
decisions are often rationalizations of results reached for other reasons) (footnote omitted).
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2. Bestfoods Offers Little Guidance in Assessing Proper Role of Parent
Corporations
The second shortcoming of the Besfoods decision is that it offers little guidance
to government agencies, corporations, and courts in assessing the proper role of
parent corporations with respect to relationships with the subsidiary and facility for
the purpose of assessing CERCLA's operator liability. The Supreme Court
acknowledged the difficulty in defining what type of actions will result in CERCLA
operator liability.2 Given the sparse and fruitless legislative history on the issue,
the Court turned to construing the term through the use of dictionaries.29 As one
commentator has observed, the use of dictionaries is not an "unprecedented source
for definitional authority,"2 but neither is it the type of exact and tailored
definition of activities that justify classifying a parent corporation as an operator of
a facility deserve.' This is especially true given the ramifications of CERCLA
liability.3°"
The Court's "sharpened" definition is ambiguous in its terms. As the focused
definition contains verbs such as manage, direct, and conduct, much room is left for
differing interpretations." As one observer has noted, these verbs encompass a
variety of actions, allowing for a broad range of practices in degree and detail.3" 3
While this standard may have more appeal and practicality than a detailed factual
standard, it is ambiguous enough to raise doubts as to its application.
The definition's ambiguity is magnified by the fact that some level of parental
involvement with a facility is necessary. Certain types of interaction with a facility
are consistent with the status of an investor.' While specific activities "such as
monitoring of the subsidiary's performance, supervision of the subsidiary's finance
and capital budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures,
should not give rise to direct liability,"' 5 these activities will undoubtedly, to some
degree, affect the operation of a facility. The difficulty arises in classifying
activities as "normal" or "eccentric."' In the words of the Court: "[t]he critical
question is whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by an agent
of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a
subsidiary's facility."' Yet, the Court failed to give any guidance on how to assess
297. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998).
298. See id (where the Court constructs "operat" with the use of the American Heritage Dictionary and the
Webster's New International Dictionary).
299. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 176 (stating that the Court cites its own precedent of Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) to justify its reliance on dictionaries); see also Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66.
300. See Silecchia, supra note 6. at 176 (discussing the difficulty of defining "operator" during the course
of oral arguments in the Bestfoods case).
301. See Poulter, supra note 22, at 78 (stating that the average cleanup cost has been estimated at $25 to $50
million dollars) (footnote omitted).
302. See Bes(foods, 524 U.S. at 66.
303. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 176.
304. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 72.
305. Id. (footnote omitted).
306. See id.; see also Silecchia, supra note 6, at 177.
307. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 72.
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the critical question and remanded this issue to the trial court for more detailed
factual findings."' 8
The Court's failure to provide definitional guidance may have an adverse effect
on effectuating CERCLA's goal of cleaning up hazardous waste for government
enforcers, parent corporations, and lower courts. Given the high stakes nature of
CERCLA liability, it is imperative that each potentially responsible party know the
boundaries of liability. As each site indisputably requires a large investment of
resources for investigation and remediation, this amount is exponentially
compounded by litigation, in both time and money, which many government
enforcers do not have to spare.'4 Often government agencies are uncertain as to the
liability and participation of potentially responsible parties.31 ° Definitional guidance
would enable government enforcers to assess the likelihood of recovering resources
spent remediating a particular site. In turn, agencies would be able to allocate more
resources to a site where responsible party involvement is not expected.
Similarly, definitional guidance would benefit parent corporations in structuring
a relationship with the facilities of a subsidiary. Like government agencies, parent
corporations have limited resources.3" A workable, factual definition would assist
corporations in making an assessment of the likelihood of liability. Such a definition
would assist parent corporations in determining which assessments are worthy of
litigation. In turn, where operator liability is likely to be found, a corporation's
resources will be better spent on investigation and remediation as opposed to costly
litigation. By failing to outline a specific set of activities constituting operation, the
Court opened the door to the possibility of inconsistent enforcement, which often
spawns litigation and increases clean-up costs, contrary to CERCLA's goals.
Lower courts may also struggle with the Court's lack of guidance. The operator
standard announced in Best foods demands that courts look at the process of decision
making at the facility, yet failed to instruct lower courts as to what types of
processes should result in operator liability. Undoubtedly, this requires a fact
intense inquiry, which lends itself to disparate, even unfair, results, similar to the
pre-Bestfoods environment." 2 This result would be clearly contrary to the Bestfoods
decision itself; a decision described as questioning the wisdom of the expansion of
CERCLA liability.313
In short, the Court's ambiguous definition leaves room for a variety of
interpretations, possibly leading to a state of affairs over the fine points of operator
liability similar to the pre-Bestfoods state of the law. This may prove to be of little
assistance to government agencies, parent corporations, and courts seeking clarity
as to what type of actions give rise to operator liability. This vagueness offers
308. See id. at 73.
309. See GAO, supra note 18, at 30 (concluding that 52 percent of states participating in survey said that
their states ability to fund cleanups is poor or very poor).
310. See id.
311. See Poulter, supra note 22, at 78 (stating that because cleanup costs are significant, the financial
viability of all but the largest firms may be threatened).
312. See Mounteer & Myers, supra note 254, at B4.
313. See Seilheimer, supra note 247 (footnote omitted).
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incentive to litigate the issue, as both enforcers and potentially liable parties argue
for favorable interpretations.314
3. Future Ramifications for Parent-Subsidiary Relationships
Finally, the Court's failure to give definitional guidance may affect future
relationships between parent corporations and the facilities of subsidiaries.
Although CERCLA does not seek to regulate current environmental activities, but
seeks to remediate past environmental harm,315 the decision may have the effect of
encouraging CERCLA-concerned parent corporations to adopt a future "hands off"
approach with respect to facilities of subsidiaries.31 6 Under Bestfoods, a contrary
approach risks the severe penalty of CERCLA liability.317
The possibility of CERCLA liability is a strong incentive for a parent corporation
to distance itself from environmental activities at a subsidiary's facility. The
Besifoods operator standard has the potential to allow a parent corporation to reap
the profits contributed by a subsidiary without accepting the associated liabilities."'
Indeed, the extreme logical consequence of this standard envisions parent
corporations setting up subsidiaries with irresponsible environmental policies for
the sole purpose of dodging environmental liability. While this position may
nonetheless be financially risky given the possibility of owner liability attaching in
this situation, it is not altogether unthinkable. Additionally, this standard may
encourage parent corporations to unload existing subsidiaries posing a future threat
of CERCLA liability.3 9 A parental corporation "hands-off" approach could result
in less responsible environmental compliance and more environmental contamina-
tion, a result clearly contrary to CERCLA's goals and the public health and safety.
The notion that parental "hands-off' could result in less responsible environmen-
tal activity is premised on the idea that parent corporations are more capable than
are subsidiaries to ensure environmental compliance and prevent environmental
contamination or pay for the remediation of a polluted site. As discussed below, this
is not always the case. However, by definition, parent corporations often have more
314. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 177-78 (footnotes omitted).
315. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
316. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 178 (concluding that "[t]his actual control test, however, might have a
significant impact on parental willingness to become involved in the operation of their subsidiaries' facilities.").
317. See id. ("Currently, the rile... penalizes parents who operate facilities at which contamination occurs
.. the decision gives ... strong incentives to disassociate themselves from the activities of their subsidiaries.")
(footnote omitted).
318. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 9, at 463 for a pre-Besfoods discussion of how a proposed standard
of parental liability would not allow a parent corporation to enjoy the profits of a subsidiary, while at the same time,
hide behind the protection of corporate limited liability.
319. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 180-81; Farmer, supra note 65, at 804 ("[P]olicy-makers should reject
adopting an unlimited parent corporation liability approach because of the potential for negative effects on the
American economy and corporate structure. One particularly compelling reason is the likelihood that industries
with potentially high environmental liabilities would splinter into smaller, less financially responsible firms.")
(footnotes omitted); Todd W. Rallison, Comment, The Threat to Investment in the Hazardous Waste Industry: An
Analysis of Individual and Corporate Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA, 1987 UTAH L REV. 585, 620
("[E]xpanding CERCLA's strict liability to shareholders may actually encourage some shareholders to act
irresponsibly. For example, a corporate shareholder may well find that divestment, an impossibility for some
corporations, is the only way it can fully insure against liability.").
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resources,320 thus more ability to prevent environmental contamination through
aggressive programs of environmental compliance. Moreover, resources spur the
development of new methods and technology for reducing, or at least decreasing,
the toxicity and generation of wastes.32'
Even if in some cases a parent corporation may be theoretically encouraged to
distance itself from the environmental activities of a subsidiary's facility, it is naYve
to assume a world of "fly-by-night" facilities set up for the purpose of escaping
CERCLA liability.322 The reality is that parent corporations often have important
reasons for involving themselves in the environmental practices of their subsidiar-
ies' facilities. One commentator has identified several reasons relevant to this
discussion.3 23 First, a parent corporation has a financial self-interest in having its
subsidiary avoid unsound environmental practices that have the potential to
bankrupt the subsidiary. Not only would a parent be robbed of its investment in the
subsidiary, but it would also lose the benefit of future earnings generated by the
subsidiary. Second, parent corporations and their subsidiaries are often closely
related in the public view. An environmental "black-eye" upon a subsidiary may
also be felt by the parent in the form of public relations costs, backlash from
investors, and negative publicity. Finally, a number of subsidiaries have the
resources necessary to manage and maintain an effective environmental compliance
program. While this will be true more often in larger and wealthier corporate
families, it nevertheless ameliorates the potential for environmental indifference by
parent corporations.
At first glance, Bestfoods appears to provide a powerful incentive for a parent
corporation to disassociate itself from its subsidiary's facilities. Further analysis,
however, suggests that there exist similarly powerful incentives to remain involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bestfoods decision assisted in clarifying the issue of parent corporation
liability under CERCLA. The Supreme Court adhered to the statutory language and
goals in delineating two distinct theories of liability under CERCLA' s "owner or
operator" provision. Moreover, the Court accomplished this end while respecting
traditional notions of corporate liability.
The reception of the Court's interpretation of CERCLA's "owner or operator"
provision has been mixed. The decision has been characterized as striking a balance
between two different but competing interests.3U It also has been described as
favorable to the government enforcement agencies3' and inversely, as protective of
320. For example, the Bunker Hill (subsidiary) received $1100 in capital, while Gulf (parent corporation)
earned $27,000,000 in dividends. See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Corp., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986).
321. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 183 (discussing that an expanded rule of parental liability provides
incentives to reduce the generation or the hazards of wastes).
322. See id. at 181 ("It would be over-simplistic to assume that Bes foods' expansion of liability to parents
operating subsidiaries' facilities will, automatically or necessarily, lead to parental irresponsibility or raise the
specter of under-funded, irresponsible subsidiaries stumbling blindly from one environmental crisis to another.").
323. See id. at 181-84 for a general discussion of the reasons for parental corporation concern.
324. See id. at 171.
325. See Linda Greenhouse, RIGHT OF STATES TO EXTRADrTE FUGITIVES IS UPHELD, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1998, at AI8 (characterizing Besqfoods as "a victory for Federal environmental enforcement"); High Court Holds
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the corporate structure.326 The true implications of the Court's decision on parent
corporation liability, and the accompanying ease or difficulty in establishing
liability, remain to be seen as lower courts apply the Bestfoods standard.327
Yet, several issues left unresolved by the Court are troubling. Lower courts are
left to decide whether to apply a federal or state law veil-piercing standard for the
purpose of determining indirect liability. Even more troubling, lower courts are left
to define what types of action will result in operator liability.328 The room left here
for a variety of interpretations may lead to a state of affairs over the fine points of
operator liability similar to pre-Bestfoods law. Also troubling is the seeming lack
of incentive the decision offers to parent corporations to become involved with the
environmental activities of its subsidiaries. The gap, however, may possibly be
closed by built-in incentives that exist for parent corporations to ensure environ-
mental responsibility at the facilities of a subsidiary.
Perhaps the criticisms of CERCLA proffered by different courts, 329 combined
with a general level of frustration felt by corporations and governmental enforcers
will encourage Congress to address problems left unanswered by Bestfoods s°
Fundamental decision-making regarding the allocation of liability under CERCLA
demands more than judicial determinations of legal issues.33' Allocation of
responsibility under CERCLA requires consideration of practical and financial
issues, inquiry into facts and empirical studies, and an evaluation of public policy.
332
Congress, rather than the courts, is best suited to making these important determina-
tions.33
Parent Liable for Unit's Pollution, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., June 15, 1998, at 7 (reporting that Lois J. Schiffer,
Assistant Attorney General for Environment, "praised the decision").
326. See Sillecchia, supra note 6, at n. 299 (citing Laurie Asseo, U.S. Actions Under Superfund Limited,
LEGAL INTELIGENCER, June 9. 1998, at 7 ("declaring that through Bestoods ... '[t]he Supreme Court yesterday
made it harder for the federal government to force companies to pay for cleaning up hazardous waste disposed at
sites owned by subsidiaries") & Kenneth J. Warren, U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Supefund Liability for Parent
Corp. in Bestfoods, LEGAL INTELIGENCER, July 16, 1998, at 7 ("The court's specific focus on control over
environmental activities at the facility.., will lead many parent corporations to breathe a sign of relief. Bestfoods
may result in noticeable limitations on CERCLA's reach over parent corporations.")).
327. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of llinois Inc. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp.2d 756 (N.D. 111. 1998)
(applying Besfoods' operator analysis to transporter); United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307 (6th
Cir. 1998) (reasoning that Besfoods' operator analysis applies to government entity as well as parent corporation);
Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distrib. Co., 166 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that Besfoods' operator
analysis "must logically" apply to cases involving arranger liability); U.S. v. Days Inns of America, Inc., 151 F.3d
822, (8th Cir. 1998) (recognizing Besfoods' operator standard in action brought under Americans With Disabilities
Act).
328. This is not a reflection upon the ability of the courts, but rather on the potential that exists within the
judicial system for disparate results.
329. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (CERCLA's legislative
history is "unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements." The court further states that CERCLA
"leaves much to be desired from a syntactical standpoint."); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.
Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986) ("The structure of [CERCLA] section 107(a), like so much of this hastily patched
together compromise Act, is not a model of statutory clarity."); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902
(D.N.H. 1985) ("CERCIA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite,
if not contradictory, legislative history.").
330. See Mounteer & Myers, supra note 254 ("Congress should not let pass the opportunity to provide clearer
guidance that can curtail this type of wasteful litigation.").
331. See Silecchia, supra note 6, at 173-74.
332. See id.
333. See Mounteer & Myers, supra note 254 ("[T]his is not an area in which Congress should acquiesce to
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Notwithstanding Congressional action, courts will continue to grapple with the
issues surrounding CERCLA liability. As one commentator has said, "it is doubtful
that the Bestfoods case will be the final word ... [tihere is simply too much
emotion and commotion surrounding environmental cases for courts to permit deep-
pocketed companies to walk away from a polluted site."33
ROBERT J. SUTPHIN JR.
judicial interpretations.").
334. See Sillecchia, supra note 6. at n. 299 (citing Sean Connaughton, Ruling May Keep Environmental Suits
from Scaling the Great Corporate Wall, J. COM. July 8, 1998, at 2B (stating that Bestfoods moves toward restoring
the protection inherent in the corporate structure)).
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